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Vinod Kumar

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Vinod Kumar last won the day on June 17

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  1. Hi @Discordant, Thank you for your suggestions. Use of TransientType instead of ConcealedType, was to support maximum number of Clipboard history managers at the time of introduction of this feature. It think we must re-evaluate the usage of clipboard flags according to current support status by Clipboard history managers and fix things as per your suggestions.
  2. Hi @ButisitArt57 On macOS, Enpass copies data to clipboard with a flag (org.nspasteboard.TransientType) that the data should not be recorded in pasteboard history due to sensitive nature of data. Only the clipboard managers that are not supporting this flag or configured to ignore this will save data to its history. Maybe you should look for some settings in your clipboard manager to control the behaviour for this flag. However, we advice against it as your clipboard history might get stored on disk un-encrypted and defeat the purpose of having a password manager. Thanks.
  3. Hi @DesignT The json export format is made for a software tool to import, such as password manager by different vendor. If you want export your attachments as normal files, please follow these instructions: 1. Select "Attachments" under "Others" section in Sidebar. This will show all items with attachments in the list. 2. Select the items, right-click and choose "Export attachments" Cheers:)
  4. Hey, Google Chrome has just updated their signing certificate which leads to an error in code signature verification in Enpass. To fix this, we have filed a bug report on a high priority. The fixed version will be available in the upcoming release. Meanwhile, you can click on the Allow button and continue. Enpass always appreciates your trust and patience!
  5. Hi @all, A fix update is available in Microsoft Store. Please update your copy to 6.63.836. We are sorry for trouble caused by the issue. We have added new tests in our pipeline to avoid such issue in future. Thank you for your co-ordination and patience.
  6. Hi @Ivarson, Thanks for bringing this into our notice. You are right we should have provided a better warning message. Icons are not treated as sensitive data and are for UI enhancement only. Obfuscating cache filename can avoid causal guessing but will not resolve the problem completely. Also, different devices resolutions, scrolling performance issues & complex updating mechanisms are few situation where we decided to avoid storing them in the main database. This was a trade-off decision we made than. Maybe it’s the time we look for alternate strategy that satisfy all the requirements. Thanks.
  7. Hi @UdhayanithiG, Thanks for raising the question. The short answer is NO. The article mostly discussed about autofill extension of online password managers which injects their UI/chrome into web page and interact with their server. This additional chrome can be exploited by clickjacking or exposed server endpoints can be accessed by additional scripts because they live in the same shared space i.e. the webpage. Here are few points how Enpass is immune to such attacks: 1. Enpass does inject only limited script to detect presence of forms that user may want to autofill. It does not inject any chrome/UI that can be clickjacked. The autofill UI is a separate process than the browser and immune to such attacks. 2. The connection between local application and browser extension is authenticated by user via manual pairing mechanism by user and communication is encrypted with a shared key which malicious scripts can't access. 3. Enpass, by default, requires user intervention before supplying any credential to webpage. In future, if Enpass introduce a feature that require additional UI injection in the webpage to increase user convenience that would certainly be inside the attack surface mentioned in the article. But be assured such a feature will be optional and you can keep Enpass extension in a configuration as it is today. Cheers:)
  8. Hi @buyrsr, I understand your concern about availability of data. You can always export data from Enpass to json format, that contains complete details of your data that can be used by a software tool. Also, Enpass uses open-source SQLCipher for database file. Enpass derives a key from the master password with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 100K iterations (outside of SQLCipher) and uses it as the raw key for SQLCipher. You can find few opensource implementations to read Enpass database file on github. Thanks.
  9. Hi @Ivarson, I understand your concern, but having a setting in Enpass will not solve it. You can always restrict Enpass connectivity via a firewall. Cheers:)
  10. Hi @electrolund, I can understand the worry of our users after this incident. I would like to provide some explanation about delivery channels and tools we use: We have our own system to notify updates and distribution apart from standard app stores. All Enpass builds are automated and scanned against virustotal service to eliminate human error. App stores: Most of the Enpass installations happens through Various App stores (Apple store for macOS and iOS, Windows store and Google Play store), that does not require any third party installer. Updates are also handled by corresponding App stores. Distributed via our website: All the download happens through our own servers only and over https. In-built updater in Enpass for macOS and Windows, check for integrity after downloading an update. 1. macOS installer is built using standard pkg tools provided by apple. 2. Windows installer is built using latest version of widely known Open source wix tools. 3. Linux packages are distributed from our own signed apt and yum repositories. Let me know if you have other queries. Cheers:)
  11. Yes. That is right. To have more information you can refer to this page. Cheers :)
  12. HI @chrismin13, Thanks again for your efforts and sharing stats with us. Both issues need to be fixed from our end in the software. We will share an internal build with you soon.
  13. Hi @Fab8 Unlocking via PIN is more of a convenience feature rather than security. In case of PIN, Enpass restricts access to data through User Interface without locking down the database. After three failed attempts, the database will be closed and a master password will be required next time. Your master password does not remain in memory any time after initial unlock of database. However, running sophisticated attacks with administrative privileges are still possible. We recommend against using PIN in such environments. :)
  14. Hi all, We have identified an issue with our handling of Dropbox Api. Upstream have made some changes and Dropbox sync is broken for iOS and Mac. We are on it and will issue an update as soon as possible. Thanks for your patience.
  15. Hi @chrismin13, Thanks for your efforts to bundle Enpass for snap store. We are a short on team to handle all kind of packaging. We will give you explicit permission to redistribute our software for snap store. Please share your email id in PM. As about other bugs, issue 1 can be resolved from our side by checking a Environment variable set by snap. Browser extension connection requires permissions to require system commands like readlink/netstat/lsof and a port open on localhost. Team is investigating the issues and possible fixes. Thanks, Vinod
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